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his issue of Essays in Philosophy explores, through 
philosophical analysis, the difficult and thorny 
subject of gun control. The impetus for proposing this issue 
was the lack of critical and reflective philosophical 
dialogue on the subject and what I viewed to be an 
increased need for engagement in a rational and measured 
debate about the ethics of owning guns and the 
permissibility of regulating or restricting their ownership.   
 
Typical treatments of the topic engage with the conflict 
between individual rights of autonomy and self-defense and 
collective rights of freedom from assault and violence. There 
are also conflicting claims about the ideal way to protect 
individuals in a society. Some suggest that more private 
ownership of guns increases collective security and decreases 
crime, while others suggest the contrary: the presence of 
more guns decreases safety and increases the possibility of 
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violent crime. More generally, there is a concern about the 
obligation of the state and its institutions in assuring 
autonomy rights, social security, and individual protection.  
 
I am excited to announce that the six contributors who have 
written essays for this issue reside in four different 
countries and offer wide-ranging insights that I hope will 
serve to advance this discussion in an interesting and 
productive manner. 
 
Kocsis’ essay “Gun Ownership and Gun Culture in the 
United States of America” starts this issue and establishes 
an excellent foundation for the remainder of the articles. 
Kocsis explores three related arguments that he claims have 
not received their due examination in previous debates. 
First, he examines the notion of liberty and the rights 
concerning property and protection. He explores the status 
of guns as private property and the relationship between 
property, liberty, and personal identity. 
 
Second, Kocsis relates his previous examination to 
contemporary American culture. He suggests that the ideals 
discussed previously have embedded themselves into 
American culture and that we must judge gun ownership 
against a backdrop of substantive cultural norms. 
 
Finally, he explains that freedom, when properly 
conceptualized, might not involve the freedom to guns, but 
instead, a freedom from guns. He employs Rawlsian ideals 
in a novel manner to arrive at a tentative conclusion that 
contractors in the original position, behind a veil of 
ignorance, might tend toward gun safety. 
 
Next, Hsiao’s essay, “Against Gun Bans and Restrictive 
Licensing” challenges Kocsis’ final assertion and suggests 
that even if the harm introduced into society by permitting 
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private citizens to own guns is outweighed by the benefits, 
neither an outright ban, nor restrictive policies are justified. 
In other words, simply because guns either have the 
potential to introduce more harm, or in fact, do introduce 
harm, is insufficient grounds to prohibit gun ownership. In 
short, because prohibiting guns (or heavily restricting their 
ownership) is the most restrictive manner in which to 
address the potential for violent assault associated with 
guns, other, less restrictive avenues must be explored first. 
 
In “Limited Government and Gun Control,” Ponzer 
responds by suggesting that the principle of limited 
government often used against gun control laws provides, 
on the contrary, justification for enacting stronger 
restrictions on gun ownership. Ponzer focuses on the two-
sided intent of the Bill of Rights and argues for an 
increased acknowledgement of the importance of not only 
restraining the power of the federal government, but of also 
protecting the rights of individuals. He suggests that the 
government has the constitutional authority (and perhaps 
more strongly, obligation), to enact stricter gun control 
regulations because the security of its citizens is at stake. 
 
In my own essay, “On Risk and Responsibility: Gun 
Control and the Ethics of Hunting,” I offer a similar 
justification for gun control. I suggest that rights that 
involve mere preference satisfaction (the right to own a gun 
for the purposes of hunting) should be trumped when at 
odds with rights that are intrinsically good (such as the 
right to bodily health and to be free from violent assault 
and bodily injury). I argue that responsibility for the risk of 
violent assault that citizens are subjected to by others 
owning a gun should be properly attributed to both the gun 
owner, as well as those charged with protecting citizens 
from harm and initiating policy designed to guarantee and 
defend a robust set of rights: the Government.  
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In “Gun Violence Agnosticism,” Bernstein responds to the 
previous essay and advocates of gun control to suggest that 
agnosticism about the criminogenic effects of gun control is 
all that is warranted. Bernstein systematically explores the 
evidence to engage with three hypotheses: the crime-
increasing hypothesis; the homicide-increasing hypothesis; 
and the anti-carrying hypothesis. Ultimately, Bernstein 
concludes that gun ownership neither causes significant 
increases in the rate of violent crime, nor in the rates of 
homicide. Finally, he suggests that laws that permit citizens 
to carry concealed firearms in public do not increase 
violent crime rates. 
 
Müller concludes this volume with his essay titled “Gun 
Control: A European Perspective.” In his piece, Müller 
responds to Bernstein and examines the prevalence of 
gun violence outside the United States to arrive at a 
conclusion about gun control and the potential for 
violence: mainly, less guns implies less potential for 
violent assault. Müller offers a utility-based justification 
for his defense of gun control and suggests that if we 
were to imagine two worlds, one with tight gun control, 
and another with loose gun control, the former and not 
the latter, would have more pleasure and less pain overall 
and thus, owning a gun would violate a social contract of 
sorts if we were all to acknowledge this utility-
maximizing goal as our mutual obligation. 
 
I remain convinced that the discussion of gun control is not 
one that is likely to end due to the reaching of an amicable 
solution any time soon. Nonetheless, I hope that facilitating 
rational, measured discussions of the topic in a careful and 
considered manner will help to expose some weaknesses in 
thinking on both sides. I hope people can begin to step away 
from emotional responses to the topic and instead, engage in 
critical reflection of the arguments being offered by both 
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advocates of stricter gun ownership regulations, as well as 
those opposed to such restrictions. I am happy to say that I 
view the contributions contained within this volume to have 
gone well beyond satisfying this goal of mine. 
